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In this paper, I examine the role of phantasia in the Epicurean theory of perception and 
thought. Making use of newly edited fragments of Epicurus’ Peri phuseôs, and recent 
interpretations of the role of phantasia in Aristotle, along with received texts of Epicurus and 
Lucretius, I consider such vexed questions as how eidôla or simulacra are reduced in size so as to 
enter the eye, and the channels by which they are transmitted from the eye to the mind. I discuss 
further the nature of phantastikê epibolê, that is, “the projection of phantasia”, and its function 
in processes of thinking and remembering.  
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Resumen 
En este artículo, examino el papel de la phantasia en la teoría epicúrea de la percepción y el 
pensamiento. Aprovechando de los fragmentos, recién editados, de la Peri phuseôs de Epicuro, 
y de nuevas interpretaciones de la función de phantasia según Aristóteles, además de textos 
transmitidos de Epicuro y de Lucrecio, considero problemas altamente discutidos tales como la 
manera en que los eidôla o simulacra se reducen de tamaño para que puedan entrar en el ojo, y 
los canales por los cuales se transmiten desde el ojo a la mente. Trato también de la naturaleza 
de la phantastikê epibolê, es decir, “la proyección de la phantasia”, y su función en las actividades 
de pensar y recordar. 
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In this paper1, I take up the vexed question of the nature of phantasia in 
Epicureanism, and more particularly what Epicurus dubs phantastikê epibolê, that is, 
“the projection of phantasia”. The core text is Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus (Ep. 
[2]), 49-52, which is examined in detail below. I begin, however, with a discussion of 
                                               
1 An earlier and much different version of this paper was delivered at a Journée d’Études on “La 
Connaissance de Causes”, on 8 June 2017, sponsored by the GDRI AITIA/AITIAI and Le Centre Léon 
Robin. That version was composed during the period of my fellowship at the Paris Institute for Advanced 
Studies (France), with the financial support of the French State managed by the Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche, programme “Investissements d’avenir” (ANR-11-LABX-0027-01 Labex RFIEA+), during 
the period 1 February to 30 June 2017; I am pleased to acknowledge my deep gratitude for that 
opportunity. I am indebted to Enrico Piergiacomi for astute comments on an earlier draft of this paper, 
and to the reports by two anonymous readers. 
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the Epicurean theory of sense perception, since perception is closely related to the 
mechanisms involving phantasia. In interpreting Epicurus’ conception of phantasia, 
moreover, I make reference both to Democritus and to Aristotle, whose views, I 
believe, lie behind and stand to illuminate Epicurus’ treatment. Of course, in contrast 
to Aristotle, Epicurus’ account will have been strictly materialist, and any interpre-
tation of his conception of phantasia must be compatible with the Epicurean physics 
of atomic motion in a void. 
 
1. Perception 
Explaining mental processes poses a special challenge to materialist theories of 
nature, and all the more so for one with the limited resources of ancient atomism. 
Perception is hard enough. Since the Epicureans appear to have rejected, or at least 
not exploited, geometrical optics, which assumed the transmission of visual 
phenomena by way of rays (cf. aktines, Epicur. Ep. [2], 49), they were left to work 
out the mechanics of vision and other senses solely through interactions among the 
atoms themselves. They postulated that objects continually emit atoms in more or less 
coherent formations, which in the case of sight, hearing, and smell are transmitted 
through the atmosphere and picked up by the sensory organ suited to receive that 
particular form of emission (Ep. [2], 48-53). These emanations must be very fine, so 
that they do not materially reduce the size of the original object even though they are 
continually being ejected (there is some evidence as well that a constant influx of 
atoms replenishes lost material; cf. Ep. [2], 48, οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ µειώσει διὰ τὴν 
ἀνταναπλήρωσιν), and they must contain all the information needed to account for 
what we actually perceive, for example, in the case of vision, shape, size, color, and 
depth. The simplest account of how the effluences that enable vision convey the shape 
of an object is that they conform to its surface; thus the laminas, that is, eidôla or 
simulacra, were imagined as very thin films, curved in accord with the form of the 
object, that travel rapidly and in closely packed sequence from the object to the eye of 
the beholder. 
This account gave rise to a well-known puzzle: if the simulacra indeed accurately 
reproduce both the shape and size of the emitting entity, how is it that images of 
something as large as a person or a mountain can enter the tiny aperture that is the 
pupil of the eye? There are various possible solutions. For example, the simulacra 
might shrink as they travel; alternatively, the eye might admit parts of the incoming 
films and then reassemble or process them, as Alexander of Aphrodisias suggested (On 
Aristotle on Sense Perception 58, 3-12; 60, 3-7; Mantissa 135, 6-18)2. It now seems 
clear that the simulacra are in fact capable of being compressed, thanks to the splendid 
new edition of the second book of Epicurus’ Peri phuseôs by Giuliana Leone3. We 
learn here, as Francesca Guadalupe Masi has recently argued in detail, that Epicurus 
                                               
2 See AVOTINS (1980); BARNES (1989); RUDOLPH (2011), 67-83.  
3 LEONE (2012). 
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outlined the means by which images, once inside the eye, are communicated along 
internal pores or passageways to the sensorium, located in the chest. There is a process 
that Epicurus calls sunizêsis, “compression” or “contraction”, to which simulacra are 
subject; it serves to reduce their size without compromising the information 
concerning the original shape of the object from which they emerged, and it seems to 
be initiated when the simulacra encounter a substance insufficiently porous to pass 
through it without major alteration. This mechanism operates in tandem with a 
binding force or allêloukhia, which keeps the effluences together despite the collisions 
they undergo while passing through the air. This latter notion we know only from 
Book 2 of the Peri phuseôs or On Nature, and it suggests how much we may be 
missing when we depend exclusively on summaries, whether by Epicurus himself or 
in the doxographical tradition, for his doctrines. As Francesca Masi observes, «These 
concepts, ἀλληλουχία and συνίζησις, which Leone has the merit of having 
recovered, clarified, and submitted vigorously to the attention of critics, constitute the 
most relevant contribution of the second book of the work, On Nature, to our 
knowledge of the Epicurean doctrine of εἴδωλα»4. These same processes can, I think, 
be invoked to explain as well how the idols emitted by an object can diminish in size 
sufficiently to enter the eye, at a stage prior to the subsequent contraction that allows 
the impressions created within the eye to circulate through the tiny pores by which 
they reach the mind. 
If this explanation is valid, then we may infer that Epicurus maintained that 
perception is a two-stage process, except in the case of those effluences that impinge 
directly on the mind or animus (e.g., the simulacra of the gods, who are perceived non 
sensu sed mente, Cic. ND I 19, 49). That is, the simulacra undergo a double transfor-
mation, as they are shrunk upon entering the sense organ (the paradigm case being 
vision) and again when they are transmitted through still smaller pores or vessels to 
the mind. At the site of the sensory organs themselves, the simulacra presumably 
stimulate or interact with what Lucretius calls the anima, consisting of fine soul atoms 
that are distributed throughout the body; this is the direct locus of sensation. As 
Francesco Verde observes, «sensation is the result of the convergence and coexistence 
of the soul and the body; on the one hand, the soul contains the greatest cause of 
sensation; on the other hand, if it were not for the ‘participation’ of the body, the 
organism would not be able to perceive anything. Thus, it is only the close conjunction 
                                               
4 MASI (2015, 119): «Questi concetti, ἀλληλουχία e συνίζησις, che Leone ha avuto il merito di 
recuperare, chiarire e proporre con forza all’attenzione della critica, costituiscono l’arricchimento più 
rilevante apportato dal secondo libro dell’opera Sulla natura alla nostra conoscenza della dottrina 
epicurea degli εἴδωλα». Masi notes that «Epicurus makes explicit reference to something that penetrates 
the mental aggregate as well, similar in shape to that which penetrates the sense organs. The term τὰ 
αἰσθητήρια is also used by Epicurus in the Letter to Herodotus very particularly to indicate the eyes. We 
know, then, that the mind is in a condition to receive the same kind of stimuli as those that penetrate the 
eyes» (114, citing Epicur. Ep. [2], 50, 5). 
DAVID  KONSTAN 
 
 4 Π Η Γ Η / F O N S  5 (2020) 
 
of the soul and the body that allows sensation»5; I add only that this juxtaposition 
must involve in the first instance those soul atoms that intermingle with the corporeal 
corpuscles at the site of perception. In the next operation, the simulacra are trans-
mitted to the part of the soul that is concentrated in the chest, which Lucretius refers 
to indifferently as the animus or the mens (he employs the compound expression mens 
animusque, III 139)6. 
There remain some questions about the process of perception, above all the role of 
the so-called tupoi or “impressions”. Repeated impacts of streams of simulacra 
entering the sense organs convey an impression or tupos of an object or kind of object. 
Pierre-Marie Morel summarizes the process as follows: «vision results from the 
reception of replicas (τύποι) or images (simulacra; εἴδωλα) that are naturally emitted 
by the object that is seen. Since they are directly transmitted by effluences which, in 
ideal conditions, preserve the structure and properties of the aggregate from which 
they come, these replicas allow us to form a representation or impression (φαντασία) 
which remains in ‘sympathy’ (συµπάθεια) with the object»7. The tupoi, however, are 
effects of the simulacra and not reducible to them. According to Democritus, at all 
events, as Kelli Rudolph has shown, «An object’s εἴδωλον flows toward the eye [...]. 
The air through which it moves [...] is condensed, i.e. ready for imprinting [...]. Eye 
effluences (i.e. visual rays) supply a simultaneous compression. The action of these 
two effluences moulds the air and results in an impression», which for Democritus 
takes place in the air. This impression contracts as it approaches the eye, where it is 
now «small enough to be ‘imaged in’ (ἐµφαίνεται) the pupil as an ἔµφασις»8. How 
long the air imprints endured, according to Democritus, is unclear; if they persist, 
then, as Theophrastus (De sensu 53) objected, one ought to be able to see them even 
when the object itself is not present. Although Rudolph deems it «more likely [...] that 
air imprints dissipate», she observes that «it may be in response to challenges of this 
sort that the Epicureans abandoned the theory of air imprints» (p. 81). But if this is 
the case, where did the tupoi form? The most reasonable hypothesis, it seems to me, 
is that they form at or in the sensory organ, prior to the transmission by way of internal 
                                               
5 VERDE (2015b, 54): «la sensazione è il risultato della convergenza e della coesistenza dell’anima e 
del corpo; per un verso, l’anima possiede la causa maggiore della sensazione; per un altro, se non vi fosse 
la ‘partecipazione’ del corpo, l’organismo non potrebbe percepire alcunché. È, dunque, solo la stretta 
congiunzione dell’anima e del corpo che permette la sensazione». 
6 There is some question about how and whether the distinction between animus (or mens) and 
anima corresponds to that which Epicurus seems to have drawn between the rational and irrational parts 
of the soul. Diogenes Laertius (X 66 = fr. 311 Usener) cites a scholium to the Letter to Herodotus, 
according to which Epicurus «says elsewhere that it [the soul] is made up of very smooth and round 
atoms, which differ greatly from those of fire; and one part of it is non-rational [alogon], and dispersed 
throughout the rest of the body; but the rational part [to logikon] is in the chest [thôrax], as is evident 
from fears [phoboi] and from joy [khara]». One might have supposed that rationality pertains to human 
beings only, but Lucretius uses both animus and mens of other animals (e.g., of a horse, II 265), and 
indeed they have to have had a central soul that processes sensations and transmit an intention (voluntas) 
to the rest of the body (II 261-94).  
7 MOREL (2007), 30 summarizing Epicur. Ep. [2], 50. 
8 RUDOLPH (2011), 76-77. 
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vessels to the mens or animus. It is only in the animus, located, as I have indicated, in 
the chest (and perhaps synonymous with the logikon part of the soul), that the tupos 
takes the form of a phantasia or idea proper.  
 
2. Idea 
The idea of idea, however, is itself complex. As Pierre-Marie Morel observes, 
«Epicureanism, like any empiricist philosophy, must confront the problem of the 
status of ‘ideas,’ whether these are understood as general notions, abstract representa-
tions, or simple thoughts. Since we grasp not only individuals (this cat, this tree here 
or that one there), but also classes or species (cats, of which that cat is an instance, 
trees in general), or again abstract notions (such as values), we necessarily grasp also 
‘ideas,’ in the very broad sense that I am employing» (MOREL 2007, 25). Morel goes 
on to explain that «the Epicureans have available a very rich arsenal of terms, often 
difficult to distinguish clearly from one another, to designate the various kinds of ideas 
or general notions». Among these is prolêpsis, “preconception” or “presumption”, 
which, according to Cicero, was Epicurus’ own coinage (it was later adopted by the 
Stoics). Prolêpsis plays a special role in Epicurean epistemology. As Diogenes Laertius 
explains, «Preconception [prolêpsis], they [the Epicureans] say, is as it were a 
perception (katalêpsis), or correct opinion (doxa orthê), or conception (ennoia), or 
universal ‘store notion’ (katholikê noêsis enapokeimenê), i.e. memory of that which 
has frequently become evident externally: e.g. ‘such and such a kind of thing is a 
man’»9. We may have a prolêpsis not only of a human being but also of gods, and still 
more generally, of justice. Animals, presumably, do not have preconceptions of these 
latter two (Epicurus states that «those animals which are incapable of making binding 
agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice 
or injustice», Principal Saying 32), but I assume they do have more concrete 
prolêpseis, inasmuch as cows and dogs can recognize other members of their species 
(it is possible, however, that this ability is due to memory alone). Phantasiai, however, 
are not concepts of this sort but rather something more like mental images that result 
when the tupoi that enter the senses reach the mind, and that may also be generated 
in the mind itself, whether by the impingement of rarefied simulacra that directly 
penetrate the animus or by an internal movement stimulated in some fashion by the 




In a recent paper, Andree Hahmann notes that «phantasia plays a crucial role in 
the Epicurean theory of perception», and he adds: «This is particularly remarkable if 
one takes the [...] similarities to the Aristotelian position into account, since Aristotle 
                                               
9 D.L. X 33, trans. LONG-SEDLEY; quoted by MOREL (2007), 27. 
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sharply differentiates phantasia from perception»10. In fact, Epicurus too distin-
guishes between aisthêsis, which takes place in the first instance in the anima (to 
employ Lucretius’ handy terminology), and phantasia, which is located in the animus 
or mens. Nor is Aristotle himself entirely consistent in discriminating between 
phantasia and perception. In the De anima, he seems to allow for two types of 
phantasia, one that is rational (λογιστική), the other based on sense perception 
(αἰσθητική, de An. III 11, 433b 29); non-rational animals only have the second 
kind11. Despite its central importance in Aristotle’s psychology, in which, as Krisanna 
Scheiter observes, phantasia «is necessary for dreaming, remembering, recollecting 
and even thinking», Aristotle’s analysis in de An. III 3, his «most extensive discussion 
on phantasia, is extremely unclear»12. 
Nevertheless, some points in Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia stand out as 
reasonably certain. First of all, as Jessica Moss observes, «phantasia always arises from 
perception - that is, every episode of phantasia is based in some way on an episode of 
perception»13. Perception leaves traces in the soul in the form of phantasmata, which 
derive in turn from aisthêmata (Insomn. 461a 19; cf. Mem. 451a 3-4); thus, every 
phantasma «is a remnant [hupoleimma] of an actual sense-impression (Insomn. 461b 
21-22)»14. Aristotle further affirms that the «passages of all the sense organs [...] run 
to the heart, or to its analogue in creatures that have no heart»15, from which it is 
plausible to infer that this is the pathway by which aisthêta are transmitted16. The 
                                               
10 HAHMANN (2015), 167. 
11 SORABJI (1993), 35, goes so far as to suggest that animals may even make certain kinds of 
judgments, according to Aristotle; he points specifically to the statement in de An. (II 6, 418a 21-22; III 
6, 430b 29-30) that a lion perceives that (ὅτι) an ox is nearby, and affirms that this claim implies a kind 
of predication. So too, in De anima Aristotle affirms that it is by virtue of phantasia that we perceive that 
(ὅτι) a white thing is round or that it is a man. Conceivably, non-rational animals, although they are 
deprived of reason and thus of beliefs (de An. III 3, 428a 19-24), nevertheless do possess phantasia of a 
quasi-rational sort and hence can make something like perceptual predications. 
12 SCHEITER (2012), 25. SCHOFIELD (1992), 253, wittily observes of Aristotle that «it would be a 
triumph of generosity over justice to pretend that he manages to combine his different approaches to 
phantasia with an absolutely clear head»; cited in VOGT-SPIRA (2007), 29, an article valuable for the 
broader connection between phantasia and literary imagination. 
13 MOSS (2012), 52. 
14 MOSS, (2012), 52. Cf. VERDE (2016b), 50, who argues that, «secondo Aristotele, l’ὑπόλειµµα di 
per sé non è l’oggetto esterno di cui esso è, per l’appunto, la traccia residuale: come si vedrà, proprio in 
ciò sembra risiedere la divergenza concettuale tra l’ὑπόλειµµα di Aristotele e lo ἐγκατάλειµµα di 
Epicuro». Verde concludes that «se secondo Aristotele l’ὑπόλειµµα (di Corisco) è tale quale Corisco ma 
non è Corisco, per Epicuro l’ἐγκατάλειµµα (di Corisco) è Corisco, in diretta conformità con la sua 
dottrina dei simulacri che fonda la veridicità/realtà della sensazione. Più chiaramente: per Aristotele il 
residuo/traccia è diverso dall’oggetto esterno, mentre per Epicuro esso è proprio l’oggetto» (60-61). I am 
not entirely convinced that Epicurus identified the residue with the object itself, but I reserve that 
discussion for another occasion. 
15 De gen. an. V 1, 781a 20-23; cited by SCHEITER (2012), 256. 
16 On the physiology behind Aristotle’s account of phantasmata and aisthêta, see BUBB (2019), 311: 
«Sensation is instantaneous, faithfully representative, and directly dependent on external objects»; 
phantasia, in contrast, «is directly dependent on sensation, but a step removed from external objects». At 
a more basic level, «sensation consists of movements imprinted on the connate pneuma, which 
reverberate through the pneuma that exists in both the sense organs and the blood and arrive at the 
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mechanism is reminiscent of Epicurus’ conception of the way in which impressions 
that result from the impact of simulacra are communicated to the animus, located in 
the chest, by way of small pores or vessels. Phantasia, however, «is independent of 
perceptible objects in a way that perception is not, for one can have a phantasia of 
something not present to perception»17; it is «a capacity for making present to the 
mind something one has perceived before»18. As Krisanna Scheiter observes, 
«perception requires the presence of a physical object, whereas phantasia does not», 
and so «the essential difference between perception and phantasia lies in their 
immediate cause»19. Something other than a perceptible object may give rise to the 
image represented by the term phantasia20. As Scheiter notes, «Aristotle describes 
phantasia as that which ‘produces something before the eye, just like the image-
making (eidōlopoiountes) that occurs in memory’» (de An. III 3, 427b 18-20, cited 
on p. 269, Scheiter’s translation). Phantasia is active, and generates an image derived 
from the storehouse of memory. 
In her penetrating study of phantasia in Aristotle, Jessica Moss argues further that 
phantasia serves principally to motivate locomotion in animals: «Through bare 
perception we can become aware of an object, but only through phantasia can we 
apprehend it as something we might want to pursue or avoid» (MOSS 2012, 54). As 
a representation of an object of perception, it retains all the qualities of the object itself, 
including its affective nature as something desirable or the reverse. As she explains, 
«phantasia motivates by being itself pleasurable or painful, just like perception [...]. If 
the actual tasting of water was pleasurable, then so too will be the memory of tasting 
it, or the anticipation of tasting some more» (57-58; cf. Arist. Rh. I 11, 1370a 27-35). 
This function of phantasia is apparently retained in Epicureanism, to judge by a 
crucial passage in Lucretius that is worth citing in extenso (IV 877-896)  
 
Nunc qui fiat uti passus proferre queamus, 
cum volumus, quareque datum sit membra movere 
et quae res tantum hoc oneris protrudere nostri 
corporis insuerit, dicam: tu percipe dicta.  880 
dico animo nostro primum simulacra meandi 
accidere atque animum pulsare, ut diximus ante. 
inde voluntas fit; neque enim facere incipit ullam 
rem quisquam, [quam] mens providit quid velit ante. 
                                               
common sensorium in the heart, which processes them» (292). As for phantasmata, «blood is in fact their 
very substrate» (295); what is more, «phantasmata are so at home in the blood because they are a part 
of the same digestive enterprise that blood is», though in this case it is external sense-objects rather than 
food that is processed (296). 
17 MOSS (2012), 52, citing Insomn. 459a 24-28; «even when the external object of perception 
(aisthēton) has departed, the impressions (aisthēmata) it has made persist, and are themselves objects of 
perception (aisthēta)» (460b 2-3). 
18 MOSS (2012), 53. 
19 SCHEITER (2012), 259-260. 
20 It is interesting that Aristotle sometimes resorts to the word eidôlon to signify “image”, as at de An. 
III 3, 427b 20, Insomn. 462a 11-17. 
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id quod providet, illius rei constat imago,  885 
ergo animus cum sese ita commovet ut velit ire 
inque gredi, ferit extemplo quae in corpore toto 
per membra atque artus animai dissita vis est; 
et facilest factu, quoniam coniuncta tenetur. 
inde ea proporro corpus ferit, atque ita tota  890 
paulatim moles protruditur atque movetur. 
praeterea tum rarescit quoque corpus et aër, 
scilicet ut debet qui semper mobilis extat, 
per patefacta venit penetratque foramina largus, 
et dispargitur ad partis ita quasque minutas  895 
corporis. 
 
«Next I will say how it comes about that we can carry onwards our steps when we 
please, how it has been given to us to move our limbs in different ways, what has caused 
the habit of pushing onwards this great bodily weight: do you attend to my sayings. I 
say that in the first place images of movement come in contact with our mind, and 
strike the mind, as I said before. After this comes wish; for no one ever begins anything 
until the intelligence has first foreseen what it wishes to do. (What it foresees, the image 
of that thing is present in the mind). Therefore when the mind so bestirs itself that it 
wishes to go and to step forwards, at once it strikes all the mass of spirit that is 
distributed abroad through limbs and frame in all the body. And this is easy to do, since 
the spirit is held in close combination with it. The spirit in its turn strikes the body, and 
so the whole mass is gradually pushed on and moves. Besides, at that moment the body 
also expands its pores, and the air (as you might expect with something always so 
sensitive to movement) passes and penetrates through the opened passages in 
abundance, and so is distributed abroad into the very smallest parts of the body»21. 
 
Lucretius begins by affirming that, when we wish to walk, simulacra that represent 
the act of walking occur to the mind and impel or thrust it forward (881-882; for the 
sense of pulso see OLD s.v., def. 8). Exactly what the source of these simulacra may 
be is unclear, but we must be cautious about assuming that they are external, as the 
Loeb translation suggests by the rendering «strike the mind»22. This is how wish 
(voluntas) arises, for the mind undertakes no action before it has seen what it may 
wish (883-884). These verses may give the impression that one must foresee an action 
by sheer imagination before embarking on it (so the Loeb translation). But it is 
important to note that providit is perfect in tense, and that provideo in this context 
may mean “see in advance” (OLD s.v., def. 1), in which case the sense will be that we 
can only wish to do something if we have previously perceived such an act, a perfectly 
natural assumption that accords with Aristotle’s view that we only know what we have 
received through the senses, or in Moss’s words, «every episode of phantasia is based 
in some way on an episode of perception». This is indeed what Lucretius affirms when 
he states that «an image [imago = phantasia] arises of what the mind sees in advance» 
                                               
21 ROUSE-SMITH (1982); but I have rendered voluntas as “wish” rather than “will,” and velit as 
“wishes” rather than “wills”. 
22 Taken this way, pulsare is pleonastic, repeating the idea in accidere. The simulacra meandi may 
derive from stored up memories of walking, as indicated below. 
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(885). The mind or animus then communicates its wish, conceived as an image, to 
the anima, which is distributed throughout the body and so strikes it in turn. Air, 
which, as I understand it, is somehow the vehicle for the image, passes through the 
opened cavities of the body and reaches to its smallest parts. The entire process looks 
like perception in reverse: instead of the tupos or impression produced by incoming 
simulacra that is transmitted by vessels from the anima to the animus, where it takes 
the form of a phantasia or phantasma, the imago or phantasia is passed back through 
the pores or cavities via the anima to the remotest limbs, which it then sets in motion. 
There is a strong resemblance to Aristotle’s conception, translated into the medium of 
atomic materialism23. 
 
4. Phantasia and Misperception 
There is a further wrinkle in the role of phantasia, both in Aristotle’s conception 
and in that of Epicurus, and that is its association with false perceptions. As Jessica 
Moss observes, «In the passages where he [i.e., Aristotle] offers definitions of 
phantasia, he characterizes it as a close relative of perception (αἴσθησις), and 
emphasizes its role in nonstandard perception and perceptual error» (MOSS 2012, 
51). Thus, Aristotle writes: 
 
«the sun appears [phainetai] a foot wide, though we are convinced that it is larger than 
the inhabited part of the earth. Thus either while the fact has not changed and the 
observer has neither forgotten nor lost conviction in the true belief which he had, that 
belief has disappeared, or if he retains it then his belief is at once true and false» (De 
an. III 3, 428a 24-b 8, cit. SCHEITER [2012], 272). 
 
Krisanna Scheiter explains: «In order for an object to appear to be a foot wide the 
perception we are having must be similar to other perceptions we have had in the past 
that proved to be a foot wide. When we look at the sun, the impression the sun makes 
on the eye sets into motion and combines with other foot-wide images that are stored 
in the primary sense organ» (p. 274). Thus, according to Aristotle, «our beliefs are 
not constrained by our current perceptual experiences. We see the sun as a foot wide, 
but we know that the sun is a great distance from the earth and we also know that as 
things move further away from us they take up less space in our visual field and 
therefore look smaller» (275). 
It is remarkable that Aristotle here offers as an example of a mistaken phantasia a 
problem that will prove to be crucial for Epicurus, who defended precisely the 
accuracy of our perception of the sun as being a foot wide, or thereabout24. For both 
Epicurus and Aristotle, the sun is perceived as a small disk. Epicurus reasons that the 
simulacra of the sun do not shrink vastly in the course of their transmission to the eye, 
                                               
23 As one of the anonymous referees reminds me, Aristotle uses the word phantasia in some contexts 
to designate something like a faculty, whereas in Epicurus the term is restricted to the sense of mental 
image or the like. 
24 See VERDE (2015b); also VERDE (2016b), 46 with n. 8; cf. ROMEO (1979). 
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since fires, unlike other distant objects, are observed not to diminish much in 
brightness or size over distances. Thus there is no contradiction between beliefs 
acquired through experience and what appears to perception. If we were convinced 
that the sun was very remote, then we would have a false notion of its size. The cause 
of such an erroneous conception is not the perception itself but a belief (doxa or, in 
Latin, opinio) that we have added to the perception, in this case that the appearance 
of a fiery object like the sun diminishes in the same proportion as other objects, or that 
the sun is much further away than (according to Epicurus) it really is25. Conceivably, 
the phantasia of the sun is itself corrupted by the false opinion, and thus differs in 
some fashion from the aisthêton, which is always valid. Alternatively, the mental 
image retains its integrity, and beliefs or opinions function in some other way to create 
a false inference concerning the sun’s magnitude (the phrase “addition of opinion” 
would seem to distinguish the belief from the phantasia). 
But what happens when the impression of something available to the senses is 
absent, as in the case of the image produced when we remember something that we 
previously saw or heard or smelled, whether in a waking state or while dreaming, or 
when we deliberately call something to mind? Does the difference between a 
phantasia and a sense impression lie, as Scheiter put it, not in the object - we see or 
remember the same thing - but in the source or cause? 
 
5. Epibolê Phantastikê 
On the usual view of Epicurean epistemology, the object of phantasia is never 
absent: thinking or imagining is simply another sense, attuned to a mental object, 
which is to say, a flow of simulacra of the finer sort that directly penetrate the animus. 
Take the following abbreviated account, which is, I think, broadly representative of 
the current communis opinio: 
 
«As far as the ideational content of thinking - that is, the thought of something - is 
concerned, Epicurus proposed a radically reductive hypothesis: just as sensations occur 
as a result of thin films emitted by objects that enter the appropriate sense organ, so too 
some of these simulacra are fine enough to penetrate directly to the mind (located in 
the chest), and that is how we imagine such objects (e.g., gods). This process is invoked 
to explain not only dream images, but many kinds of mental impression, including 
impressions constituting voluntary thought: the latter occur when we attend to one or 
another of the exiguous physical films that are continuously floating through the air 
[...]. Imagining a thing is thus nothing more than picking out the simulacra that have 
been emitted by it, and which may endure beyond the life of the thing itself (hence we 
can imagine the dead). These mental images [...] do not differ from the information 
provided by the senses. Mistakes occur here too when the wrong beliefs are associated 
with such impressions, for example, that because we have a mental image of a dead 
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person it follows that he or she still exists in a ghostly form. Epicurean physics proves 
that this is impossible»26. 
 
I wish to take issue with this description, of which I happen to be the author. I 
propose that phantasiai can indeed arise in the mind by way of memory, although 
they are not entirely without reference to external objects. The process involved is the 
mysterious epibolê tês dianoias or epibolê phantastikê. 
As Andree Hahmann observes, «It is well known that Epicurus ascribed to epibole 
a fundamental function in his epistemology. He even considered it as one of the 
criteria of truth (D.L. X 31, 3-5)»; actually, Diogenes Laertius says that “Epicureans” 
- presumably later members of the school - so classified it, but there is evidence that 
the doctrine in fact goes back to Epicurus himself. Hahmann notes that «there is wide 
disagreement about the exact nature of epibole», but, he argues, «the determination 
of the type of activity that is involved in perception depends on a correct interpretation 
of the Epicurean conception of epibole». I would say rather that epibolê is central not 
just to perception but also, and primarily, to ideas or phantasiai. Hahmann indeed 
notes that «there are two different kinds of epibole that are employed by Epicurus. 
He distinguishes between an epibole of the mind and an epibole of the sense organs 
(Ad Her. 50, 5-6: καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωµεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς 
αἰσθητηρίοις)». At this point, Hahmann reaffirms the conventional view of mental 
activity according to Epicurus: «With regard to their functions, it seems reasonable to 
assume that both are responsible for the selection of particular visual images from the 
vast number of images that affect the mind and the sense organs. According to a 
passage in Lucretius, this happens through an effort or focusing of the mind or the 
organs»27. There is, however, room for doubt as to whether Epicurus is distinguishing 
in this passage between two sorts of epibolê, one pertaining to the senses, the other to 
the mind28. In the phrase, καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωµεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ 
ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις (50, 5-6), quoted above, it is possible to take ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ 
                                               
26 KONSTAN (2018). 
27 HAHMANN (2015), 164. Cf. VERDE (2016a), 345: «È certo che le ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας 
compaiono, però, più volte nell’Epistola a Erodoto (35, 36, 38, 50, 51, 69, 70, 83) e nella RS XXIV, 
Lucrezio (II 740) sembra rendere ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας con animi iniectus, laddove la probabile 
traduzione fornita da Cicerone, iniciens animus et intendens, come già nel caso delle notitiae, non è 
lontana da quella di Lucrezio». 
28 Contra VERDE (2016b), 56: «Tale φαντασία, aggiunge Epicuro, dovrebbe essere afferrata 
ἐπιβλητικῶς, ossia ricorrendo con ogni probabilità a quella φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή che, stando a 
Diogene Laerzio (X 31), gli Epicurei seriori considerarono un canone epistemologico a tutti gli effetti. 
Tale ‘atto di applicazione,’ con cui si identifica l’ἐπιβολή, è relativo tanto al pensiero quanto agli organi 
di senso (ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις). Evidentemente non è possibile che, quanto 
all’attività dell’ἐπιβολή, la διάνοια e gli organi sensoriali si comportino allo stesso modo: secondo 
Epicuro, in ogni caso, la φαντασία può essere ‘afferrata,’ compresa (λάβωµεν) tramite l’ἐπιβολή del 
pensiero e quella dei sensi. L’esito di questo processo sarà che la φαντασία compresa coincida 
esattamente con la forma (esteriore) dell’oggetto solido (µορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεµνίου) da cui i 
simulacri sono partiti. Ma in che modo si forma tale µορφή? O meglio: in che modo si forma la 
φαντασία di tale µορφή? Epicuro risponde che essa si genera κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωµα ἢ ἐγκατάλειµµα 
τοῦ εἰδώλου». This last phrase is discussed below. 
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διανοίᾳ with φαντασίαν alone and not also with τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις; on this reading, 
Epicurus states that we receive a phantasia either by way of an epibolê of thought or 
else by the aisthêtêria, without the element of projection in the latter case29. Phantasiai 
received via the senses would involve a two-stage process: first, simulacra will have 
struck the sense organ in question and transmitted to it a tupos or impression; the 
sensory information would then be forwarded, in compressed form but losing no 
relevant information, to the animus. As we have seen, Aristotle too seems to have 
allowed for both perceptual and mental phantasiai30. 
What is the function, then, of epibolê in the reception of mental phantasiai? In 
accord with the prevailing view of Epicurean epistemology, epibolê has been 
associated with attention or focus, as a way of selecting among the innumerable 
simulacra floating in the ambient atmosphere. As Hahmann writes, «Today we are 
tempted to say that epibole draws the attention of the perceiver to certain visual 
images. As a result, a phantasia emerges in the soul». Hahmann immediately adds, 
however, that «it is problematic to connect epibole with attention taken in an 
unqualified sense. As some interpreters note, epibole occurs in dreams as well. 
Therefore, it is impossible to interpret epibole in line with just any form of deliberate 
conscious attention»31. But if epibolê does not represent an act of attention, what does 
it do? As a projection, if that is the right translation, it would appear to operate in the 
opposite direction to the reception of a phantasia, indicated by the term lambanô. 
Literally, the phrase ἣν ἂν λάβωµεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ should 
mean: “whatever phantasia we receive in the mind by projection (or by projection of 
the mind)”. To unpack this condensed expression, it is necessary to examine the entire 
passage in detail; for convenience, I divide it into two sections, which I discuss in turn. 
 
I. [49] Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νοµίζειν ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν τὰς µορφὰς ὁρᾶν 
ἡµᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ ἔξω τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν 
τοῦ τε χρώµατος καὶ τῆς µορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ µεταξὺ ἡµῶν τε κἀκείνων, 
οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων ἢ ὧν δήποτε ῥευµάτων ἀφ' ἡµῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα 
παραγινοµένων, οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡµῖν ἀπὸ τῶν 
                                               
29 Aisthêtêria presumably refers to the sense organs such as the eye and ear, though it may 
conceivably represent the seat where sensory information is processed, located in the mind. 
30 RUNIA (2018) argues that the Placita had sources other than those recorded in Diogenes Laertius; 
Placita IV 9 runs: Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ, τῶν δὲ δοξῶν τὰς µὲν 
ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. καὶ ἡ µὲν αἴσθησις µοναχῶς ψευδοποιεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὰ νοητά, ἡ δὲ 
φαντασία διχῶς· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν («Epicurus (says that) every 
sensation and every impression is true, but of the opinions some are true and some false; and the sensation 
gives us a false picture in one respect only, namely with regard to objects of thought; but the impression 
does so in two respects, for there is impression of both sense objects and objects of thought», trans. Runia 
429-430). A fragment from one of the lost books of Epicurus (fr. 38 Arrighetti) may suggest an 
association between phantasia and the logikon part of the soul, but the condition of the text renders any 
interpretation insecure: 
[   ]ν[..]σε[..]α[.]ε[.]ως οὐδὲ κα[τὰ] φα[ν]τα- (10) 
σιαν, οὐδὲ [γ’ ἂ]ν ἐπὶ λο[γ]ικ[ὴ]ν, κ[αθ]ὼς 
πολλάκις [ποι]οῦντα[ι]. οἱ δέ γ[ε] — — προ 
31 HAHMANN (2015), 164; cf. Lucretius IV 962-1029. 
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πραγµάτων ὁµοχρόων τε καὶ ὁµοιοµόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρµόττον µέγεθος εἰς 
τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὠκέως ταῖς φοραῖς χρωµένων, [50] εἶτα διὰ ταύτην 
τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων καὶ τὴν 
συµπάθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειµένου σῳζόντων κατὰ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν σύµµετρον 
ἐπερεισµὸν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεµνίῳ τῶν ἀτόµων πάλσεως. καὶ ἣν ἂν 
λάβωµεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε µορφῆς 
εἴτε συµβεβηκότων, µορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεµνίου, γινοµένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς 
πύκνωµα ἢ ἐγκατάλειµµα τοῦ εἰδώλου.  
 
I. [49] «Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external 
objects that we see and think of their shapes. For external objects could not stamp on 
us [ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο] the nature of their own color and shape by means of the air 
which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays [τῶν ἀκτίνων] or 
effluences of any sort which pass from us to them - nearly so well as if certain 
impressions [τύπων], similar in color and shape, coming from the objects enter our 
sight or mind in a suitable size, maintaining their swift motions, [50] and then, in this 
way, yielding [ἀποδιδόντων] an image [φαντασίαν] of a single continuous thing and 
preserving an affinity [συµπάθειαν] with the object in accord with the proportional 
impact from there, [that is,] from the vibration of the atoms according to their depth 
within the solid body. Every image [φαντασίαν] that we receive by the mind in a 
projective way [ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ] or by the sense-organs, whether of shape or 
of properties, is the shape of the solid body, generated by the continual pressure 
[πύκνωµα] or residue [ἐγκατάλειµµα] of the simulacrum»32. 
 
Epicurus begins by distinguishing his theory of perception from two others. First 
is the notion that external objects leave a seal in the air between themselves and the 
observer - clearly an allusion to Democritus’ view of the way in which the tupos is 
produced at the intersection of the εἴδωλον of the object that flows toward the eye 
and the eye’s own effluences. Second is the idea that vision results from rays that travel 
from the eye to the object: this is the so-called extramission account, as opposed to 
intromission, by which the motion is from the object to the eye - a view associated 
principally with Empedocles and Plato (Ti. 45b-46a). Epicurus might easily have 
incorporated extramission in his atomic system, since simulacra are constantly emitted 
from the eye as well as from other objects, and if impressions or tupoi are lodged in 
the sensory organs, this information too might be carried by the effluences. But 
Epicurus does not apply the terminology of projection to tupoi but rather to 
phantasiai, and more specifically those received by the mind. Mental images would 
thus appear to involve a two-way process, both afferent (lambanein) and efferent 
(ekballein): we receive images mentally in a way that involves a kind of projection. 
But how does this work - what is projected, and to what destination? I will suggest 
that phantasiai in the mind are received from memory (or stored up images) and 
projected or emitted in turn to the sensory organ, by the same vessels along which the 
tupoi were originally transmitted to the animus. Before proceeding further with the 
demonstration, we may turn to the second half of the passage under consideration 
                                               
32 My translation; text as in DORANDI (2013), except where noted. 
DAVID  KONSTAN 
 
 14 Π Η Γ Η / F O N S  5 (2020) 
 
(words in square brackets and smaller type are not translated; the reader is forewarned 
that the text is in some places highly insecure; see below): 
 
II. τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διηµαρτηµένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζοµένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν <ἐπὶ τοῦ 
προσµένοντος> ἐπιµαρτυρηθήσεσθαι ἢ µὴ ἀντιµαρτυρηθήσεσθαι, εἶτ' οὐκ 
ἐπιµαρτυρουµένου <ἢ ἀντιµαρτυρουµένου> [κατά τινα κίνησιν ἐν ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς 
συνηµµένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν, καθ' ἣν τὸ ψεῦδος 
γίνεται.]33 [51] Ἥ τε γὰρ ὁµοιότης τῶν φαντασµῶν οἱονεὶ ἐν εἰκόνι 
λαµβανοµένων ἢ καθ' ὕπνους γινοµένων ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς 
διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἀληθέσι 
προσαγορευοµένοις εἰ µὴ ἦν τινα καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς ἃ βάλλοµεν · τὸ δὲ 
διηµαρτηµένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ µὴ ἐλαµβάνοµεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡµῖν 
αὐτοῖς συνηµµένην µὲν <τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ,>34 διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν· κατὰ 
δὲ ταύτην [τὴν συνηµµένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν]35, ἐὰν 
µὲν µὴ ἐπιµαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιµαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιµαρτυρηθῇ 
ἢ µὴ ἀντιµαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές. [52] Καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν 
κατέχειν, ἵνα µήτε τὰ κριτήρια ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας µήτε τὸ 
διηµαρτηµένον ὁµοίως βεβαιούµενον πάντα συνταράττῃ. 
 
II. «Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to what 
is waiting to be confirmed or not disconfirmed, and then is not confirmed or is 
disconfirmed. [51] For the similarity of the images [φαντασµῶν] that are received as 
in a picture, or that arise in sleep or any other projections of the mind [ἐπιβολὰς τῆς 
διανοίας] or the other criteria [κριτηρίων], to things which exist and which are called 
true could not be if there were not these things against which we project [πρὸς ἃ 
βάλλοµεν]. And error would not exist if we did not receive some other motion 
[κίνησιν] within ourselves that is fitted36 to the imagistic projection [φανταστικῇ 
ἐπιβολῇ] but has some difference [διάληψιν]; and it is in accord with this [sc. 
projection]37, if it is not confirmed or is disconfirmed, that falsehood arises, but if it is 
confirmed or not disconfirmed, the truth. [52] It is therefore necessary to hold on firmly 
to this belief, so that neither may the criteria in respect to actualities be destroyed nor 
error be equally established and confound everything». 
 
Epicurus’ discussion of imagistic projection is closely bound up with his analysis of 
error. Accurate images reach the mind through various channels, but they are subject 
to distortion because of beliefs that we hold that are not properly derived from sensory 
or mental inputs but arise in other ways (Epicurus does not specify here how we 
acquire false opinions, but they are caused partly by mistaken inferences, for example 
concerning the distance of the sun on the analogy with other perspectival phenomena, 
                                               
33 DORANDI (2013) omits Usener’s supplement <ἐπὶ τοῦ προσµένοντος> and obelizes 
†ἐπιµαρτυρηθήσεσθαι ἢ µὴ ἀντιµαρτυρηθήσεσθαι [...] καθ' ἣν τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται†. 
34 Supplied by Usener; DORANDI (2013) omits it. 
35 The phrase is omitted in ms. Z, and marked as a gloss by Usener; it is enclosed in curly braces by 
Dorandi. 
36 συνηµµένην (from sunaptein) is often used of thought; cf. LSJ s.v., def. 2. 
37 Conceivably the antecedent of κατὰ δὲ ταύτην is dialêpsis, in which case Epicurus will have meant 
that confirmation and the reverse depend on the difference between the phantasia and the object; 
however, I think it more likely that the epibolê is meant, as the criterion that allows one to verify the 
accuracy of the phantasia. 
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and partly from commonplace but erroneous habits of thought, as in the case of 
superstitions regarding the nature of the gods). Physically, such fallacious opinions 
take the form of mental motions, which indeed bear a relation to the images we receive 
either directly by the mind or by the senses, but nevertheless differ from them in some 
respect. To eliminate such deviations, it is necessary to test our mental images against 
their external sources, to see whether they are confirmed or disconfirmed. This takes 
place by projecting the phantasia onto the source of the image. This might be 
conceived of as the incoming simulacra, but because Epicurus rejects extramission in 
the visual process, it is likely that the projection is entirely internal to the organism. It 
is when the projected phantasia encounters the tupos from which it originated that it 
can be confirmed, which is to say, shown to match the impression, or else 
disconfirmed, due to its deviation (dialêpsis) from it: there is not a perfect fit. Such 
projection is the process in which one must consistently engage to be sure that our 
ideas are true. It may thus be regarded as a criterion, according to Epicurean 
epistemology, since, like perception, the pathê of pain and pleasure, and the 
prolêpseis, it delivers the truth about the world. 
Some further observations are in order. First, projection is not only a means of 
putting images to the test; it occurs on a regular basis as one of the ways we acquire 
information, along with, for example, visions we have while asleep. There seems to be 
a constant back and forth between the senses and the animus or dianoia, presumably 
along the pores or vessels by which sensory information is transmitted to the mind. 
Second, it must be acknowledged that the text of Epicurus’ letter is rather a mess; this 
pertains not only to the obvious repetitions and misplaced phrases, which editors 
adjust in various ways, but also to the reading of crucial words. The prime instance is 
the phrase, “if there were not these things against which we project”. The last words 
correspond to the Greek πρὸς ἃ βάλλοµεν, which conforms to the manuscripts 
(though some read ὅ instead of ἃ) and is retained by Dorandi, but was emended by 
Usener to εἰ µὴ ἦν τινα καὶ τοιαῦτα προσβαλλόµενα38. We may note too that 
confirmation here is not deduction or inference, but takes the form of a comparison 
of the image in our mind with the imprint on the senses (or, it may be, directly on the 
mind), which involves, on an atomistic account, the physical encounter of the image 
with the corresponding tupos - a process that may be deliberate but, I presume, need 
not be: there may be an ongoing interchange along the connecting apertures of which 
we must simply take notice (or hold on to the belief, as Epicurus puts it). The same 
process is at work in non-human animals, I suppose, but since they do not have beliefs, 
there is no danger that their mental images will be biased and so the projected 
phantasiai will always correspond accurately to the sensory impression39. 
                                               
38 HICKS (1925) reads εἰ µὴ ἦν τινα καὶ τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἃ παραβάλλοµεν; Verde (2010) plausibly 
prints τινα καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς ἃ <ἐπι>βάλλοµεν; others emend variously. Gassendi is responsible for 
emending ταῦτα to τοιαῦτα. 
39 I have not taken account of a possible distinction between φαντασίαι and φαντασµοί, but have 
treated the two terms as synonymous in this context. Both terms are distinct, I believe, from phantasma, 
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Since all perceptions are true, according to Epicurus, and yet people clearly have 
incorrect ideas about the world, it was incumbent upon the Epicureans to explain 
how such mistaken conceptions arise. The answer lay in atomic motions inside the 
mens or animus that alter and distort the phantasiai, which originate in the 
transmission of impressions from the senses to the mind but are subject to internal 
influences. These phantasiai are able to circulate back to the sensory organs by the 
same vessels that communicate to the animus the tupoi produced by simulacra. There, 
they either match the sensory impressions or differ in some respect; if they differ, it is 
a sign that they are erroneous. The important thing is to be attentive to possible 
discrepancies. The projected mental image will, upon contact, indicate whether it is 
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